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European Central Bank working paper series 43Abstract
We study how public policy can contribute to increase the share of early stage and
high-tech venture capital investments, thus helping the development of active venture
capital markets. A simple extension of the seminal model by Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997) provides a theoretical base for our analysis. We then explore a unique panel
of data for 14 European countries between 1988 and 2001. We have several novel
ﬁndings. First, the opening of stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies
positively aﬀects the shares of early stage and high-tech venture capital investments;
reductions in capital gains tax rates have a similar, albeit weaker, eﬀect. Second, a
reduction in labor regulation creases the share of high-tech investments. Finally, we
ﬁnd no evidence of a shortage of supply of venture capital funds, and no evidence of
an eﬀect of increased public R&D spending on the share of high-tech or early stage
venture capital investments.
Keywords: Venture Capital; Capital Gains Tax; Public R&D Expenditure; Barriers to Entrepre-
neurship; Stock Markets; Public Policy.
JEL classification: G10, G24. H20, O30.
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The  creation  of  'active'  venture  capital  markets,  i.e.  venture  capital  markets 
which provide strong support for early stage and high-tech ventures, has received a high 
priority by economic policy. As economies become ever more dependent on innovation 
and entrepreneurship for achieving sustained growth, governments around the world 
have been trying to replicate the diffusion and success that venture capital has achieved 
in the United States. These attempts absorb large sums of public money. Yet, we still 
know little about what policies can help create active venture capital markets, and our 
study contributes a step towards filling this gap. 
We first introduce the notion of 'innovation ratios,' defined as the ratio of early 
stage (or high-tech) investments to total venture investments. These ratios measure the 
extent to which venture capital markets are active. A simple extension of the model of 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) points to determinants of these ratios which are under the 
influence of policy-makers. The first is the supply of venture capital funds, which is 
shown to affect innovation ratios only if there are binding credit constraints. Then there 
are  factors  which  may  impact  project's  expected  returns.  Exit  markets  for  venture 
investments and the level of capital gains taxation affect the capital gains that investors 
and entrepreneurs can reap when they succeed. Technological advances can be turned 
into commercially valuable ventures. Finally, barriers to entrepreneurship may affect 
expected returns by influencing the cost of creating a new venture.  
Starting with Gompers and Lerner (1998) several empirical studies have looked 
at  the  development  of  venture  capital  markets  and  their  determinants.  Our  paper 
advances the literature on several counts. First, we use a model to guide our empirical 
investigation, which is based on ratios instead of levels of demand and supply. Our 
panel approach, based on data for 14 European countries over 1988 to 2001, is another 
innovation. Previous studies either lacked panel data or examined the determinants of 
cross-country  variation  in  the  levels  of  venture  capital.  We  focus  instead  on  the 
determinants of active venture capital in each country over time, being interested in the 
effects of government policy.  Moreover, our study relies on panel data for all policy 
variables, including the taxation of capital gains and barriers to entrepreneurship.  
Our results provide several insights. First, we look at the opening of 'New' stock 
markets target at entrepreneurial companies, and find that it considerably increases both 
the early stage and high-tech innovation ratios. Our panel setting thus provides strong 
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January 2005and Gilson (1998) and Michelacci and Suarez (2004). Second, we find that a reduction 
in capital gains taxation increases both the high-tech and early stage ratios, albeit the 
economic effect is not very large. Third, we consider several alternative measures of 
barriers  to  entrepreneurship,  and  find  that  those  related  to  labor  regulations  have  a 
significantly negative effect on the share of high-tech investments. These results are 
consistent with our model, which suggests that a higher expected rate of return makes 
more venture funds available for companies with lower collateral, such as those in high-
tech and early stage, and thus results in an increase of the innovation ratios. 
Last but not least, our data do not provide any evidence of a shortage of venture 
capital  funds  for  European  companies,  contrary  to  what  assumed  by  the  prevailing 
policy  approach.  Nor  we  find  evidence  that  public  expenditure  in  research  and 
development  (R&D)  favors  the  innovation  ratios  through  the  creation  of  better 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 430
January 2005
support for the importance of an exit option for venture capital, as suggested by Black 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Venture capital is a form of intermediation particularly well suited to support the creation
and growth of innovative, entrepreneurial companies (Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002),
Kortum and Lerner (2000)). It specializes in ﬁnancing and nurturing companies at an
early stage of development (’start-ups’) that operate in high-tech industries. For these
companies the expertise of the venture capitalist, its knowledge of markets and of the
entrepreneurial process, and its network of contacts are most useful to help unfold their
growth potential (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2004), Gompers (1995), Hellmann and
Puri (2002), Lerner (1994, 1995), and Lindsey (2003)). By contrast, when venture capital
is applied to companies at a later stage of their growth, or in companies which operate
in technologically mature industries, it has less of an opportunity to ’make a diﬀerence’
(Michelacci and Suarez (2004)). Economics thus points to the relevance of providing an
adequate share of venture investments in high-tech and early stage companies.
The creation of ’active’ venture capital markets, i.e. venture capital markets which
provide strong support for early stage and high-tech ventures has received a high priority
by economic policy, which appreciates its importance for achieving continued economic
growth and job creation ((Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002a), European Commission (2003),
OECD (2001)). As economies become ever more dependent on innovation and entrepre-
neurship for achieving sustained growth (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Giavazzi (2003), Nelson
and Romer (1996), OECD (2001)), governments around the world have been trying to
replicate the diﬀusion and success that venture capital has achieved in the United States
(Megginson (2004)). These attempts absorb large sums of public money. Yet, we still
know very little about what policies can help create active venture capital markets, and
our study contributes a ﬁrst step towards ﬁlling this gap.
We start by providing a simple extension of the seminal model of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) which helps us focus on the determinants of the distribution of ﬁnancing
between early and late stage, and between high-tech and low-tech, investments. We extend
the model by Holmstrom and Tirole by allowing for the possibility of an excess supply of
funds. As in the original model, ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their ability to pledge collateral
against borrowing, but we also assume that this ability is higher for ﬁrms that possess
more tangible assets, which are more easily accepted as collateral than intangible assets.
As ﬁrms mature from start-ups to later stage ventures, they can rely more on tangible
assets. Likewise, ﬁrms in high-tech industries make more use of intangible assets than
those in traditional industries. This creates a ’pecking order’ in ﬁrms’ ability to pledge
collateral against loans.
We use this framework to introduce the notion of ’innovation ratios,’ deﬁned to be the
ratio of early stage (or high-tech) investments to total venture investments. These ratios
provide a measure of the extent to which venture capital markets are active. They are
useful for studying how policy can make venture capital markets not only larger but also
focussed on those ﬁrms which can most beneﬁt from the support of a venture capitalist.
While simple, this framework is rich enough to point to several potential drivers of
active venture capital markets which are under the inﬂuence of policy-makers. The ﬁrst
is the sheer supply of funds available for investment, which could ease binding credit
7
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existence of exit markets for venture investments and the level of capital gains taxation,
both of which aﬀect the capital gains that investors and entrepreneurs can reap when they
succeed; and the existence of good technology, which can be turned into commercially
valuable ventures. Third, there are factors which aﬀect expected returns by determining
the cost of creating a new venture, namely barriers to entrepreneurship.
Starting with Gompers and Lerner (1998) several previous studies have looked at the
development of venture capital markets and their determinants. Our approach allows us
to advance the literature on several counts. First, we use a simple model to guide our
empirical approach, which is based on ratios instead of levels of demand and supply–
unlike previous analyses.
Our panel approach, based on data for 14 European countries over 1988 to 2001, is
another innovation. Previous studies either lacked panel data or focussed on ’between’
country estimators. Jeng and Wells (2000), for example, use a panel of OECD country-
level data for 1986-95, and focus on cross-country analysis; their approach raises issues
of unobserved heterogeneity, that our panel approach can address adequately. Based on
our comprehensive set of policy variables, we choose to provide an answer to the question
of what can governments do to increase the innovation ratios rather than understanding
cross-country variation in the levels of the ratios; we thus focus on estimating ’within’
country eﬀects. Our choice is motivated also by the nature of our data, which come from
a rather homogeneous set of developed economies.
One notable exception to pure cross-country comparisons is Gompers and Lerner
(1998), who use a panel of U.S. state-level variables for examining the eﬀect of varia-
tions in taxation during the 1976-94 period.1 However, ours is the ﬁrst study to analyze
all policy variables with a panel dimension. Our results provide several novel insights.
First, we look at the opening of ’New’ stock markets target at entrepreneurial compa-
nies, and ﬁnd that it considerably increases both the early stage and high-tech innovation
ratios. Our panel setting thus provides strong support for the importance of an exit option
for venture capital, as suggested by Black and Gilson (1998) and Michelacci and Suarez
(2004).
Second, we examine the taxation of capital gains, which has recently received con-
siderable attention in theoretical studies of venture capital (e.g., Keuschingg and Nielsen
(2003, 2004)). Previous empirical analyses looked at cross-sectional comparisons of taxa-
tion across OECD countries (e.g., Armour and Cummings (2003)). We extend them by
collecting a panel of country-level data which goes back to 1988. We ﬁnd that a reduction
in capital gains taxation increases both the high-tech and early stage ratios, albeit the
economic eﬀect is not very large.
Third, we consider the eﬀects of a reduction in barriers to entrepreneurship. Like in
the case of taxation, we believe we are the ﬁrst to introduce a panel dimension into the
analysis. We consider several alternative measures of such barriers, and ﬁnd that those
related to labor regulations have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the share of high-tech
1See also Armour and Cumming (2003), who develop an original measure of the leniency of bankruptcy
laws across 15 European and North American countries over 1990-2002.
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 430
January 2005
investments.These results are consistent with our model, which suggests that a higher expected rate
of return makes more venture funds available for companies with lower collateral, such as
those in high-tech and early stage, and thus results in an increase of the innovation ratios.
Finally, our data do not provide any evidence of a shortage of venture capital funds for
European companies, contrary to what assumed by the prevailing policy approach. Nor
we ﬁnd evidence that public expenditure in research and development (R&D) favors the
innovation ratios through the creation of better entrepreneurial opportunities.
Overall, the European experience we analyze thus suggests that the creation of active
venture capital markets might depend crucially on providing investors and entrepreneurs
with the possibility to reap the beneﬁts of their eﬀorts, rather than on providing them
with more funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes recent policy
programmes for venture capital markets. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 describes
our data and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports our results, and is followed by a brief
conclusion.
2 Public policy for active venture capital markets
To the extent that growth depends on innovation and creative destruction, and that inno-
vative ﬁrms suﬀer from credit constraints because of asymmetric information, one could
think of fostering productivity by channeling more funds into venture ﬁnancing of techno-
logically innovative companies. This reasoning has in fact held sweeping inﬂuence on policy.
While venture capital was born in the U.S. out of private initiative (Gompers (1994)), its
expansion beneﬁted from the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme in
the 1980s (Gans and Stern (2003), Lerner (1999)). Interestingly, the SBIR programme,
which pioneered public policy towards venture capital by investing several billion dollars,
was largely motivated by the fear that insuﬃcient ﬁnancing was available to innovative
small ﬁrms.
The perceived need to overcome this market failure by increasing the supply of risk
capital is probably the main motivation for public policy in favor of venture capital mar-
kets. Such an approach has also informed recent public policy initiatives, most notably in
Israel and Europe. In Israel, the Yozma programme, started in 1992, provided 100 million
dollars of public funding to attract private funds for over 150 millions (Avnimelech and
Teubal (2002)). Yozma helped create ten private venture capital ﬁrms and to jump-start
a successful and active venture capital market. In 2001, the European Commission trans-
formed the European Investment Fund (EIF) into Europe’s largest venture investor with
an injection of more than 2 billion euros (EIF (2002)), making the increase of the supply
of risk capital one priority of its policy towards innovation and capital markets (European
Commission (1998, 2003)).
This approach is shared by many other large national programmes, from Germany’s
federal and regional schemes for innovative companies (German Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomics and Technology (1999)), to the French ’Plan Innovation’ (French Ministry of In-
9
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fund in 2001 (Danish Growth Fund (2003)), and to the creation of the UK High Technol-
ogy Fund (HM Treausury (2003)). Public programmes aimed at increasing the supply of
venture capital have also been implemented in several emerging economies, from Chile to
India (Carter, Barger, and Kuczynski (1996), Gilson (2003), Lerner and Schoar (2004)).
The economics foundations for such policies are however still unchecked. While venture
capital is widely thought to foster the creation of particularly innovative and dynamic com-
panies, this does not imply that more funds would directly translate into a larger number
of successful companies. Theory warns about the value-reducing eﬀects of increasing the
supply of funds to the venture capital industry when competition for good projects is high
(Inderst and Müller (2004)). In such an environment, promoting innovation by increasing
research and development (R&D) expenditure would be more eﬀective than stimulating
the funding of the venture capital industry.
Recent empirical work also casts doubts on the hope to increase investment into new
ventures simply by increasing the supply of risk capital. Looking at U.S. sector-level data,
Hirukawa and Ueda (2003) argue that, at the aggregate level, it may be innovation activity
to lead the development of venture capital, and not vice versa. Also Gompers and Lerner
(1998) emphasize the role of R&D expenditure in the development of the U.S. venture
capital industry.
The view that factors other than the supply of funds may be important for the creation
of active venture capital markets has also yielded inﬂuence over policy. For example, the
increase in R&D expenditure is seen as one of the main factors lying behind the discovery
of new technology, and thus to the arrival of new entrepreneurial opportunities. On these
bases, the Barcelona European Council of March 2002 set the objective to increase the
average investment in R&D in Europe from 1.9% to 3.0% by 2010, of which two thirds to
be funded by the private sector (European Commission (2002)).
Three other factors have held inﬂuence over policies toward active venture capital
markets. One is the need to oﬀer an exit option to venture capital investors. The realization
of a large capital gain when bringing a company public is arguably the greatest incentive
to venture investing. Moreover, venture capital should beneﬁt from the ability to exit
from investments before the marginal value of their time and money starts to decrease.
Michelacci and Suarez (2004) formalize this notion, and show that active stock markets
induce the development of a vibrant venture capital industry. The Risk Capital Action
Plan adopted by the European Commission in 1998, subscribed to this view and greatly
inﬂuenced national policies in the late 1990s (European Commission (1998)). The recent
demise of the Neuer Markt and other European ’new’ markets, however, cast serious doubts
on the positive eﬀect of this approach (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2004)).
Second, the taxation of capital gains has long been pointed to as a driver of both
entrepreneurship and venture capital investment (Poterba (1989a,b), Gompers and Lerner
(1998)). Recent theories argue in favor of reductions of capital gains tax rates on the
ground of incentive eﬀects for the provision of eﬀort by venture capitalists (Keuschnigg and
Nielsen (2001) and Keuschnigg (2004)). Capital gains taxation has been recently reduced
in several countries (EVCA (2003)). For example, investment vehicles with a favorable
taxation have been introduced in 1995 in the UK (’Venture Capital Trust’) and in 1997
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lowering the eﬀective taxation have also been enacted in Germany (1998 and 2000), the
Netherlands (1996), Spain (1996 and 2001).
Finally, barriers to entrepreneurship–which range from the formalities needed to es-
tablish a corporation, to regulatory and administrative opacity and barriers to competition–
are another important hindrance to the formation of new companies. The reduction of such
barriers has thus been advocated as a major step towards the creation of entrepreneur-
ial companies, and has been object of recent empirical analyses (see Alesina et al. (2003),
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2004) and Scarpetta et al. (2002) among others). One impor-
tant ﬁnding which motivates our interest is the decrease in business regulations in several
European countries over the 1990s, documented in a series of OECD studies reviewed in
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
Which of these approaches, if any, receive support from the data is however unclear.
This study provides new evidence in this respect.
3 A model of venture capital markets
In this section we provide a simple extension of the seminal double moral hazard model
of ﬁnancial intermediation by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to study the structure of
venture capital investment.2 We start by summarizing the key ingredients of the model,
which formalizes the idea that the ability to pledge collateral determines both the amount
and the type of ﬁnancing that a ﬁrm can obtain. We refer the reader to the original article
for further details. We then use the model to deﬁne the concept of innnovation ratio, and
we extend the model to the case of excess supply of venture capital.
The model lasts two periods. In the ﬁrst period ﬁnancial contracts are signed and
investments are implemented. In the second period uncertainty about project returns
is resolved and payments are made. There is a continuum of ﬁrms–or, equivalently,
entrepreneurs–which have access to a project that delivers a payoﬀ equal to R>0 with
probability pH and to 0 otherwise. The cost of the investment is I. Firms need to borrow
the amount I − A>0,w h e r eA denotes a ﬁr m ’ so w ne q u i t yc a p i t a lw h i c hi sp l e d g e da s
collateral. We denote by G(A) the cumulative uniform density of collateral for all ﬁrms,
which we assume to be continuous. Entrepreneurs are able to divert resources from the
project and extract private beneﬁts equal to B>0, which reduces the probability of
success to pL <pH.
Firms can borrow from arms’ length (’uninformed’) investors or from (’informed’) ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries. Uninformed investors simply provide funds and require a return γ,
which reﬂects their opportunity cost of funds. In addition to providing funds, ﬁnancial in-
termediaries can also monitor, which reduces private beneﬁts to 0<b<Band mitigates the
2The double moral hazard model, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist exert non-
contractible eﬀort, has become the workhorse of the theoretical venture capital literature (see Casamatta
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with venture capital ﬁrms.
Finally, we assume that only the good project is economically viable, which we can
write as: pHR − γI > 0 >p LR − γI + B.
3.1 Direct ﬁnance
It is easy to show that some ﬁrms with low equity capital will not be ﬁnanced by unin-
formed investors, because their capital is not enough to generate the correct incentives
for entrepreneurs to behave diligently. Let Rf be the share of the payoﬀ retained by the
ﬁrm, and Ru=R−Rf the share paid out to uninformed investors. A necessary condition
to obtain ﬁnance is that the entrepreneur prefers not to shirk, i.e. pHRf ≥pLRf+B.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition to obtain ﬁnance from uninformed investors is
then:







which says that the market value of the loan (the left hand side) cannot exceed the
ﬁrm’s expected income (the right-hand side). Firms are then able to raise ﬁnance from
uninformed investors if and only if:









where A is increasing in γ.
3.2 Venture capital ﬁnance
Credit rationing of ﬁrms with A<A creates a role for monitoring by venture capital ﬁrms.
In this case, a monitored entrepreneur chooses not to shirk only if pHRf ≥pLRf+b.
Let Rvc be the share of the payoﬀ paid out to the venture capital ﬁrm. We assume
that monitoring has a private cost c>0, so that the venture capitalist will monitor only if
her expected payoﬀ compensates for the private cost of monitoring: pHRvc−c≥pLRvc.
The rate of return to venture capital, denoted by β, is given by β = pHRvc/Ivc,w h e r e
Ivc is the amount of funds borrowed by monitored ﬁrms. We then see that the value of Ivc




Venture ﬁnance costs more than uniformed capital, since it must compensate for moni-
toring eﬀort. It follows that in equilibrium Ivc takes the lowest possible value which allows
venture capitalists to recover the monitoring costs, the residual ﬁnancing needs of a ﬁrm
being served by cheaper uninformed capital. The above equation thus holds as an equality.
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investors and venture capitalists is then:









where it can be shown that A increases in both its arguments, so that more credit constrains
become tighter as the rate of return required by either type of investor increases. Panel (a)
of Figure 1 represents the ﬁrms ’ﬁnancing choices, depending on their own equity capital.
3.3 Equilibrium
The aggregate demand for uninformed capital, denoted by Du(γ,β) is the sum of two
components. The ﬁrst is the demand from ﬁrms which can aﬀord not to borrow venture
capital , i.e. ﬁrms with A>A(γ). This amounts to (I − A). The second component is the
demand from ﬁrms which also receive venture capital, i.e. ﬁrms with A(γ,β)<A<A(γ).








The market for uninformed capital clears when demand equals supply:
Du(γ,β)=S(γ) (1)
where S(γ) denotes the supply of uninformed capital, with S0(γ) > 0. The aggregate






which is increasing in pH and decreasing in β. In equilibrium, this is equal to the supply
of venture capital, Kvc, which we take to be ﬁxed in the short run, as in Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997). This assumption is similar to that of limited supply of venture capitalists
imposed by Michelacci and Suarez (2003). It reﬂects the notion that it takes time to
increase the supply of specialized intermediaries. While ’money is green,’ venture capital
requires considerable experience and skills (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2004)), which
need time to accumulate. Panel (b) of Figure 1 represents the venture capital market
equilibrium.
To characterize the equilibrium we notice that the market clearing condition for all




[I − A]dG(A)=S(γ)+Kvc (3)
Panel (c) of Figure 1 represents the equilibrium of ﬁnancial markets when the supply of
uninformed capital is inﬁnitely elastic. This is not an unrealistic case because the market
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uninformed capital may well be insensitive to the return to private equity. This assumption
is maintained below to simplify our proofs, which are found in the Appendix. Our results
carry over to the case of an elastic supply of uninformed capital3.
3.4 The innovation ratios
We denote by Di
vc the demand for innovative venture capital investments, where i =
ES,HT, ES stands for early stage investments, and HT for high-tech investments. We
deﬁne Di
vc as innovative investment, characterized by collateral lower than a constant A∗,
with A ≤ A∗ ≤ A:
Di
vc(γ,β)=[ G(A∗) − G(A(γ,β))]Ivc(β) (4)
and study the structure of venture capital investment. To this purpose we deﬁne the ’in-









Our ﬁrst results then characterizes the eﬀects of changing market conditions on the equi-
librium value of the innovation ratios:
Proposition 1 The innovation ratios decrease following a reduction in either the supply
of venture capital funds (Kvc) or projects’ expected return (R), as ﬁrms with low own
equity capital are denied credit.
These two cases are portrayed in Panels (d) and (e) of Figure 1, respectively. This
proposition establishes that innovative investment–being characterized by lower collateral–
is sensitive to variations in the supply of private equity capital and in project returns.
3.5 Equilibrium with excess supply of venture capital
The occurrence of excess supply of venture capital may not be unrealistic, since there is
evidence pointing to a ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon in both the 1980s and 1990s in
the U.S. industry (see Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan and Stein (1993)). We thus
consider the case when the supply of venture capital exceeds its demand at the minimum
rate of return acceptable to a venture ﬁrm.4 This rate is given by β = γ
pH
pL ,a n di st h el o w e s t
3Restrictions must then ensure that the supply of capital to ﬁrms is more sensitive to shocks when
collateral is lower.
4This case is not discussed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), who focus on asymmetric responses of β
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uninformed investor. It is thus increasing in γ.






[I − A]dG(A)=S(γ)+Kvc (6)
where A(γ)≡A(γ,β) is increasing in γ, so that the total demand for funds is decreasing
in γ. This condition uniquely determines the equilibrium rate of return on uninformed
capital. Notice that the lowest possible value of A(γ,β) is reached when β=β,e v e r y t h i n g
else being constant. The largest number of ﬁrms is thus getting ﬁnanced by venture capital
in the case of an excess supply of funds, since A(γ) is independent of β. The excess supply
of venture capital funds, Kvc−Dvc(γ,β), is invested in ﬁrms with own capital above A,
earning a return γ.
We now examine the eﬀects of an increase in Kvc on the equilibrium allocation when
Kvc>Dvc at β=β.
Proposition 2 (i) A contraction in the supply of venture capital funds does not aﬀect the
innovation ratios; (ii) a reduction in project return R decreases the innovation ratios.
We refer the reader to Figure 2.5
3 . 6 T a k i n gt h em o d e lt ot h ed a t a
Our empirical strategy attempts to assess, with the guidance of our model, the eﬀects
of alternative policies on the innovation ratios. We consider two diﬀerent types of poli-
cies. First, we look at the amount of funds channeled to venture capital markets, which
provides the empirical counterpart of Kvc. Second, we look at policies which may aﬀect
the innovation ratios through their inﬂuence on the return to a project, R.W ec o n s i d e r
policies which aﬀect returns either directly, like the taxation of capital gains, the existence
of a stock market for entrepreneurial companies, or public expenditure on R&D; and we
look at policies which aﬀect returns indirectly, by determining the cost of creating a new
venture, namely the reduction of barriers to entrepreneurship.
After describing our data, in Section 4.2 below we spell out in more detail our empirical
strategy.
5These results can be shown to hold also when projects are less than perfectly correlated and when
monitoring eﬀort or cost are not ﬁxed.
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4.1 Data sources and description
Our analysis is based on a panel of data gathered from several sources. We consider data
for the following 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK
over the years between 1988 and 2001.6
These countries constitute an ideal set of countries to look at for our purposes. They
form a relatively homogeneous group of economies which share broadly similar institu-
tions and are linked by a common market. At the same time, there has been a substantial
variation over time in the evolution of the venture capital markets, which have matured
substantially over the 1990s (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2004)). And variation has been notice-
able also in our explanatory variables: the availability of stock markets for entrepreneurial
companies, taxation of capital gains, the intensity of barriers to entrepreneurship, and
public R&D spending.
4.1.1 Dependent variables
Our source for the dependent variables is the European Venture Capital Association
(EVCA), whose yearbooks are compiled from an extensive yearly survey of member and
non-member ﬁrms.7 Yearbooks report data on a number of variables, organized by country.
For each year and country, we look at the reported amount of total funds invested. This is
divided into ﬁve categories: seed, start-up, expansion, replacement capital, and buyouts.
We deﬁne venture capital (VC) to be the sum of the ﬁrst four categories, and non-venture
private equity to equal the last one. The sum of venture and non-venture private equity
investments is referred to as (total) private equity (PE). We then partition venture capital
investments into early stage (ES)–equal to the sum of seed and start-up investments–and
late stage (LS)–equal to expansion investments and replacement capital.
We then deﬁne high-tech investments (HT) as the sum of investments in the following
sectors: communications, computer related, other electronics related, biotechnology, med-
ical and health related. Low-tech investments (LT) are the investments in the remaining
sectors: energy, consumer related, industrial products and services, chemicals, industrial
automation, other manufacturing, transportation, ﬁnancial and other services, agriculture,
and construction. Finally, we deﬁne the Early Stage Ratio as the ratio of ES to VC, and
the High-Tech Ratio as the ratio of HT to PE.8 These two ratios form the empirical
correspondent of the innovation ratios we deﬁned in the model.
6We do not include in our analysis the US in order to avoid mismeasurement errors. While the US
constitute the world’s largest private equity market, the venture capital data collected by the National
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) are coded with diﬀerent deﬁnitions than those of the EVCA.
7For details on the EVCA database, and for deﬁnitions of variables, see the methodology section of
EVCA (2001).
8Ideally, we would like to be able to measure the High-Tech Ratio as the ratio of HT to VC. A limitation
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We then consider our independent variables. Our measure of the funds raised by venture
capital ﬁrms is the total amount of funds raised from all sources by a country’s private eq-
uity ﬁrms in given year.9 We express all values in euros, using the synthetic euro exchange
rate of Datastream for the conversion. From Datastream we also download population and
price indices for all countries. We use population to express values in per capita terms,
and price indices to obtain constant 2000 values.
Our measure for the incremental exit opportunity is the existence of a stock market
targeted at entrepreneurial companies, since several European countries opened such trad-
ing segments within their stock markets during the 1990s (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002b)).
For all European ’New’ stock markets we obtain the date of opening from the respective
stock exchanges.
We then introduce two new variables to this literature: a panel of capital gains tax
rates and a panel of measures of barriers to entrepreneurship.
We obtain our measures of capital gains taxation from the Worldwide Corporate Tax
Guide, published by Ernst&Young, a leading tax consulting ﬁrm. Each year, the Guide
reports for over 140 countries the main corporate tax rates, including capital gains. Coun-
try information is compiled by Ernst&Young local oﬃces, which ensures high professional
standards and consistency, both over time and across countries.
Barriers to entrepreneurship might aﬀect innovation ratios if early stage and high-
tech investments are particularly sensitive to bureaucratic impediments. We collect our
measures of barriers to entrepreneurship from yearly issues of the World Competitiveness
Yearbook compiled by IMD, the business school, since 1989. The Yearbook provides 241
country-level quantitative and qualitative measures of competitiveness assembled from
public data and surveys of local business leaders in 60 countries.
From the Yearbook we obtain seven measures of potential barriers to entrepreneurship.
These are the following: (1) the extent to which anti-trust laws prevent unfair competition;
(2) the extent to which bureaucracy hinders business development; (3) the extent to which
improper business practices (e.g., corruption) prevail in the public sphere; (4) the extent
to which access to foreign capital markets is restricted for domestic companies; (5) the
ﬂexibility of hiring and ﬁring practices; (6) the extent to which immigration laws prevent
the employment of foreign skills; and (7) the extent to which foreign investors are free
to acquire control of a domestic company. All measures are normalized to lie between 0
and 10, with a higher value corresponding to a weaker barrier. We use both the individual
measures and their unweighted average.
To measure the arrival of entrepreneurial opportunities, we use the amount of public
R&D expenditure. From the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators database we
obtain data on country-level total research and development (R&D) expenditure, business
and government R&D, and R&D in higher-education. In the Appendix we describe the
9Note that while funds invested are recorded according to which countries they go into (the ’country of
destination’ criterion), funds raised are recorded by the country where the venture ﬁrm is based (the ’coun-
try of management criterion,’ see EVCA (2001)). Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) discuss the importance
of cross-border capital ﬂows, which in Europe–while increasing over time–remains relatively small.
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R&D for each country and year.
The following are formal deﬁnitions for all the variables we use in the analysis:
• PRIVATE EQUITY (PEit) is the amount of funds invested in private equity in
country i at year t. It includes both venture capital and non-venture private equity
investments.
• VENTURE CAPITAL (VC it) is the amount of funds invested in venture private
equity in country i at year t.
• EARLY STAGE (ESit) is the amount of funds invested in early stage venture private
equity in country i at year t.
• HIGH-TECH (HTit) is the amount of funds invested in high-tech private equity in
country i at year t.
• ES-RATIO (ESRit)is the ratio of ESit toVC it.
• HT-RATIO (HTRit)is the ratio of HTit toPEit.
• SUPPLY OF FUNDS (SFit) is the amount of funds raised by the private equity
industry in country i in year t. It is normalized by the country’s population in year
t.
• NEW MARKET (NM it) is a dummy that takes value 1 if a ’New Market’ is available
for ﬁr m st ol i s ti nc o u n t r yia ty e a rt .
• CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE (CGTit) is the capital gains tax rate in country i at
year t.
• BARRIERS (BARRit)i st h ev a l u eo fo u rs y n t h e t i cm e a s u r eo ft h eb a r r i e r st oe n -
trepreneurship in country i at year t.
• BARRIER (BARR—Jit) is the value of each measure of the barriers to entrepre-
neurship in country i at year t, where J=AT (anti-trust laws), BUR (bureaucracy),
COR (corruption and improper business practices), FCM (access to foreign capital
markets), HF (ﬂexibility of hiring and ﬁring practices), IMM (immigration laws),
FAQ (feasibility of foreign acquisitions)
• PUBLIC R&D STOCK (RDit) is the stock of public and academic expenditure in
R&D in country i in year t. It is normalized by the country’s population in year t.
In the Appendix we describe the methodology we use to build RDit.
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 430
January 20054.2 Empirical strategy
The innovation ratios form the cornerstone of our analysis. The ﬁrst reason for this is that
we are interested not in the size of venture capital markets per se, but in the extent to
which increasing the size of venture capital markets translates proportionately more into
early stage and high-tech investments. The ratios capture precisely this eﬀect.
There are also methodological reasons for our emphasis on ratios. As it is well known
(see Hellmann (1998)) estimating a structural model of demand and supply is made very
problematic by both the unobservability of the rate of return on venture capital invest-
ments and the diﬃculty to convincingly identify observable variables which aﬀect only
demand or only supply. For this reason most previous studies chose to estimate reduced
form equations where the level of venture capital investment is regressed against a set of
(typically time invariant) observable factors which in general are expected to aﬀect both
supply and demand. This estimation strategy, however, is likely to suﬀer from serious
omitted variable problems.
Our panel estimation methodology allows us to disregard country-speciﬁca n dt i m e -
invariant factors. However, it does not protect us from the eﬀects of unobservable time-
varying factors. Since our panel is relatively long (fourteen years), and contains a period
when several economic reforms have been implemented, we run the risk that some time
varying policy variables which aﬀect the level of venture capital investing–like general re-
forms in product or factor markets–may have changed considerably. Our focus on ratios
minimizes this mispeciﬁcation risk, since it allows to omit time-varying country-speciﬁc
explanatory variables to the extent that they equally aﬀect the numerator and the denom-
inator of the innovation ratios.
More generally our approach exploits the time-series dimension (’within’ estimates) of
our data, and asks which genuinely time-varying factors are responsible for the evolution
of the innovation ratios, and thus for the development of active venture capital markets.
We then use country ﬁxed eﬀects to identify time-invariant factors such as the industrial
specialization of individual countries.
Our model suggests that an increase in the innovation ratios could be achieved in two
ways. First, by increasing projects’ expected return, and second, if there is no excess supply
of monitoring capital, by channeling more funds towards the private equity industry. We
address the empirical relevance of these two channels by estimating several versions of the





dt + εit (7)
εit = ηi + νit (8)
where yit denotes either the early stage or the high-tech ratio, and xit is a vector of
time varying country speciﬁc characteristics including the supply of funds (SFit), the
level of the capital gains tax rate (CGTit), the barriers to entrepreneurship (BARRit and
BARR-Jit), the availability of a ’New’ stock market (NM it), and the stock of public R&D
(RDit). As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the ﬁrst variable is expected to be positively
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 430
January 2005signed only if there is no excess supply of informed capital; the other four variables should
aﬀect our ratios through projects’ expected return–the second negatively and the last
three positively. To control for common aggregate eﬀects we also include a full set of time
dummies, where dt is a T ×1 vector with 1 in the t-th position and 0 otherwise. Finally, we
model the error term, εit as the sum of an individual country’s heterogeneity component,
ηi and an idiosyncratic error term, νit.
We recover estimates of the parameters of interest by applying the so-called within-
group estimator. This estimation method allows individual (country) heterogeneity to be
correlated with the observable components of the model. As we have noticed, this is partic-
ularly important in our case since there are country speciﬁc time invariant unobservable
variables that are potentially correlated with some of the regressors. On the other hand,
the identiﬁcation of structural eﬀects through regression coeﬃcients in deviations from
country-speciﬁc means depends on the lack of correlation between the regressors and the
idiosyncratic error term at all leads and lags. This strict exogeneity assumption rules out
the possibility that current values of some of the variables in the x vector are inﬂuenced
by past idiosyncratic errors.
In our context, this does not seem an unrealistic assumption, since a transitory shock
to the innovation ratios is unlikely to aﬀect present and future institutional decisions on
capital gains taxation, on public R&D expenditures, on the regulation of business activity,
or on the opening of a local ’New’ stock market.10 Notice also that, in order to respect
the requirement of strict exogeneity of the regressors, we normalize RDit and SFit by
population and not by GDP, which is the measure of country size typically used in the
literature. Finally, the strict exogeneity requirement is also the reason why we employ
public R&D rather than business (or total) R&D expenditure.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
We start exploring our data by looking at the facts which motivate our analysis. Table
1 shows descriptive statistics for our main variables. It should be noted that less than a
quarter of venture capital investment goes to early stage projects, and less than a third of
the total private equity investment is in high-tech projects.
Two Figures look at the evolution over time for the aggregate of the 14 countries we
consider. Figure 3 plots the two private equity ratios, and Figure 4 the total supply of
funds into private equity. What stands out is the sharp upturn in the supply of funds
starting in 1996 and its equally sharp fall since 2001, which is mirrored in the sharp drop
in all the two private equity ratios. At ﬁrst sight, this evidence suggests that the supply
of funds may in fact pose a binding constraint on investment.
For each country, Figure 5 then reports 3-year moving averages of the innovations
ratios, which provide further evidence of the pattern shown by Figure 3. For both innova-
tion ratios, we notice some variability across countries. While such cross-country variability
10In particular, the creation of ’New’ stock markets started in 1997 and was completed by 1999 in most
countries. As our descriptive statistics below make clear, this should dispel concerns for endogeneity, since
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minants of variations between countries. Given the diﬃculty to identify, and even more
obtain, such variables, we prefer to explore the time dimension of the data and control for
country-speciﬁc factors by using time-invariant country-level eﬀects.
Overall, these Figures provide evidence of a positive relationship over time between the
supply of private equity funds and the early stage and high-tech ratios. Whether this visual
evidence can be given a structural interpretation is a task we pick up in our regressions.
5 Regression results
5.1 Main results
Results from the estimation of our basic speciﬁcation for equation (7) are presented in
Tables 2 and 3. Each Table refers to a speciﬁc ratio, and reports estimated coeﬃcients
together with the corresponding standard errors. In each Table three sets of estimates are
reported which include one of our three chosen measures of the barriers to entrepreneur-
ship. We ﬁrst use our summary measure (the average value of our seven measures). We
then run the basic speciﬁcation with each measure in turn, but we report only the two
which turns out to be signiﬁcant.
Notice that, since (unreported) time dummies are included in all equations, our esti-
mates genuinely pick the eﬀects of changes in our explanatory variables. For example, the
eﬀects of the availability of a ’New’ stock market targeted at entrepreneurial companies
are captured beyond what one might fear is a common cyclical trend.
Our main results can be summarized as follow. We ﬁnd convincing evidence that three
types of policy have an important eﬀect on the innovation ratios: the opening of ’New’ stock
markets, the taxation of capital gains, and the reduction of barriers to entrepreneurship.
First, the coeﬃcients of the capital gains tax have a negative eﬀect on the ratios which is
highly statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. The economic eﬀect is however small:
moving the capital gains tax rate from the lower tail (5th percentile ) to its higher tail
(95th percentile) raises the high-tech ratio by about 0.003 (or 1%) and the early stage
ratio by about 0.001 (or 0.5%).
The intuition behind this result is that an increase in the rate of return on venture
investment (Rvc) makes it possible for companies with high collateral to obtain ﬁnance
from uninformed investors. thus freeing up venture capital (monitored) funds for early
stage and high-tech companies. This result corroborates that by Gompers and Lerner
(1998), who looked at U.S. data. However, their ﬁnding was based on a panel of U.S.
state-level data, where the variation in capital gains tax rates is very small; therefore they
mainly relied on a short time-series of federal-level variations in capital gains taxation.
Our data provide a more comforting setting for a panel analysis.
Second, we also ﬁnd the opening of a ’New’ market to have a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on both the early stage and the high-tech ratios. The economic eﬀect in this case is
also noticeable, as the opening of a ’New’ market raises the high-tech ratio by about 10%
and the early stage ratio by nearly 9%. This is consistent with the model’s predictions if
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 430
January 2005IPOs provide larger capital gains than acquisitions or a ’trade sales’–a fact documented
by Brau, Francis and Kohers (2002) and Gompers and Lerner (1997).
It also suggests a more sobering approach to the critiques of the recent experience of
the ’New’ stock markets, which often focus on the issue of losses to individual investors.
Our results provide a diﬀerent perspective.
Third, the average indicator of reduction of the barriers to entrepreneurship turns
out to be positive but not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. However, the
reduction of two of the barriers have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the high-tech
ratio. This eﬀect is also economically very large. Moving either the hiring and ﬁring or the
immigration laws measure from their 5th to its 95th percentile raises the high-tech ratio
by between 0.190 and 0.240 (or 65% to 80%). This result is particularly telling, since it is
arguable that lower barriers to the hiring of foreign skills are particularly important for
high-technology companies. Also the reduction in hiring and ﬁring barriers is likely to be
relevant for these companies. Notice that the early stage ratio is unaﬀected by these policy
measures. Our interpretation is that early stage companies are less dependent on skilled
workers than high-tech ones, and that they are likely–almost by deﬁnition–to have a
low level of employment, and so be exempt from many hiring and ﬁring restrictions.Notice
also that many high-tech companies in our sample are not early stage, and many early
stage companies are not high-tech–dispelling the seeming contradiction of the results on
the eﬀects of the barriers to entrepreneurship on the two innovation ratios.
Fourth, in all reported equations the supply of funds variables are never statistically
diﬀerent from zero. This holds for both innovation ratios; it is also robust to several
alternative deﬁnitions and time/country stability assumptions, which we describe in the
next section. Therefore we do not ﬁnd evidence supporting the ’no excess supply’ of venture
capital hypothesis in Europe during our sample period.
Finally, the stock of public R&D capital is also found to have a negligible, statistically
insigniﬁcant, eﬀect on the innovation ratios.11 This suggests that increasing public R&D
does not result in a higher return of entrepreneurial ventures.
5.2 Extentions and robustness checks
In this Section we extend our results, especially by delving more deeply into the lack of
evidence for a role of the supply of funds, and address several methodological concerns.
First of all, we explore diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the supply of funds, and report our main
extensions in Tables 4 and 5. Columns (i), (iv),a n d(vii) of both Tables take care of
the well known fact that the funds raised by venture capital companies in one particular
year are not necessarily invested in the same year (Gompers and Lerner(2000)). This may
suggest that our baseline static model suﬀers from a dynamic misspeciﬁcation problem. To
address this additional concern we rerun all our equations after including the once lagged
variable, SFit−1 to the original speciﬁcation. While we lose some observations due to the
use of a lagged variable, this does not alter signiﬁcantly our overall results.
11As a check on the robustness of this result, we also use the stock of total R&D, which includes private
(business) R&D, despite the fact that it clearly fails the strict exogeneity requirement.
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might aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of the supply of funds. Our results in Tables 1
and 2 might therefore suﬀer from pooling together two diﬀerent regimes. Columns (ii),
(v),a n d(viii) of Tables 3 and 4 report our results, where we identify the ’bubble’ years
with 1997 through 2000. We ﬁnd no evidence of a diﬀerent role of the supply of funds in
the two periods.
Another possibility we wish to examine is that diﬀerent countries may experience a
diﬀerent eﬀect of the supply of funds depending on their stage of development. Arguably,
countries where venture capital markets are less developed may also experience a lack
of professional expertise which might have an adverse eﬀect on the innovation ratios.
Columns (iii), (vi),a n d(ix) of Tables 3 and 4 report our results on this issue. What we
do here is to allow for a diﬀerent eﬀect of the supply of funds depending on the fact that a
particular venture capital market is ’developed’ or not–where we deﬁne ’developed’ to be
a country with a (per capita) supply of funds higher than the median at the start of our
panel (1988).12 With these equations we want to explore the possibility that evidence in
favour of the ’no excess supply’ of venture capital hypothesis is more likely to be found in
countries with a less mature venture capital industry. One readily sees that this extension
has no material eﬀect on our estimates.13
We then turn to several possible methodological concerns, for which we estimate, but
do not report, additional variations of our basic speciﬁcation.
First, our ﬁndings might not be robust to alternative deﬁnitions for some of the inno-
vation ratios. In particular, it might be argued that the replacement capital component
should be excluded from the pure venture capital activity. This, in turn, would alter the
denominator of the early stage to venture capital ratio, ESR. To address this legitimate
concern we rerun all our reported equations after redeﬁning the relevant ratios. Our ﬁnd-
ings are virtually unaltered. We also check the robustness of our results when the supply
of funds variable include realized capital gains, and ﬁnd comforting evidence.
The same occurs if we disaggregate the eﬀects of diﬀerent sources of funds to single out
the funds supplied by institutional investors and by the government.14 It can be argued
that these two categories may have diﬀerent goals than other investors, and therefore
instruct venture fund managers to comply with diﬀerent objectives (see Mayers, Schoors,
and Yafeh (2002)). In particular, institutional investors have a longer run perspective than
others, and the government may also be more interested in the creation of long-run growth
opportunities than the sheer maximization of proﬁts. However, when we separate these
two categories from the total supply of funds, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant changes, and
the signiﬁcance of these two new variables is far from any acceptable level.
An important assumption in our analysis so far has been that the presence of a New
12The countries which turn out to have a relatively less mature venture capital equity industry (in 1988)
a r eA u s t r i a ,B e l g i u m ,F i n l a n d ,G e r m a n y ,G r e e c e ,I t a l y ,P o r t u g a la n dS p a i n .
13In unreported regressions, we also check that this results does not change if we allow a country to
switch between ’developed’ and ’not developed’ each year.
14The EVCA data breaks the sources of funds into the following categories: realized capital gains,
corporations, individuals, government agencies, banks, pension funds, insurance companies, funds of funds,
academic institutions, capital markets.
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always willing to buy shares of companies which go public. However, it is well know that
the markets for Initial Public Oﬀerings (IPOs) experience cycles which bring them over
waves of ’hot’ or ’cold’ investor appetite. In other words, the availability of an institution
may by itself not be enough. To explore this possibility we introduce in the analysis a
panel of stock market indices. For each country, we obtain from Datastream the yearly
average of the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) stock market index for the
main stock market. We take the MSCI index to be a measure of investors’ appetite for
stocks. Notice that we employ the MSCI index for the main market rather than for any
’New’ market–or the number of IPOs in the current or previous year–in order to abide by
the strict exogeneity condition. We then estimate a set of equations where we include the
MSCI index as an explanatory variable. We introduce this variable both with an additive
and a multiplicative term. In either case, it turns out that this variable is not signiﬁcant,
a n di np a r t i c u l a rt h a ti td o e sn o ta ﬀect the magnitude or signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient for
the New markets.
We also explore in our context the result of Gompers and Lerner (1998) on the role of
pension funds. They show that the clariﬁcation of the ’prudent man rule’ in the context
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act brought to a surge of pension fund
investments in venture capital. To date, pension funds remain the largest single source of
venture capital in the U.S. (NVCA (2003)). Several countries in Europe began reforming
the structure of their social security system from pay-as-you-go to funded in the 1990s.
As a consequence, the ﬁnancial assets of pension funds have increased. This may have a
substantial impact on the funding of venture capital, if pension funds are allowed to invest
in it. In EU member states the dominant principle governing asset allocation of pension
funds is the prudent man rule. Thus these institutions are allowed to invest in venture
capital, as long as adequate diversiﬁcation is maintained. Member states are allowed to
impose quantitative limits to investments and several do regulate portfolio shares allocated
to closed funds. We then isolate the supply of venture capital which comes from pension
funds. We ﬁnd no evidence of a distinct role of pension funds in our data.
An important concern is that the real bottleneck is not money but people. Michelacci
and Suarez (2004) do stress the human factor in ﬁnancial intermediation, whose empirical
importance is documented in Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2004). To address this
issue, we construct a variable consisting, for each country and year, of the number of
venture capital ﬁrms which are members of the European Venture Capital Association.
We then use this variable in alternative to the supply of funds. The resulting estimates
conﬁrm our main results by not showing any sign of a shortage.
One speciﬁc concern can be raised in relation to the Early Stage Ratio. It is well known
that venture-backed companies typically receive staged ﬁnancing (Gompers (1995)). This
means that the company will receive funds over several rounds across a few years. Since
the company would then progressively mature from the seed or start-up stages to later
stage deals there is clear suspicion that the ﬁgures for late stage ﬁnancing simply reﬂect
’life-cycle’ eﬀects and not investment decisions by the venture capitalists. We can control
for this important observation by including in our regressions for the ES Ratio the lagged
value of the absolute amount of early stage investments. We are comforted by noticing
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that our results are unchanged.Finally, one could be concerned that our results are driven by a single country. We
can easily discard this possibility by re-running our regressions excluding one country at a
time. Overall, therefore, our results appear to be consistently robust to a variety of checks.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we use a panel data analysis to study how public policy can contribute to the
creation of active venture capital markets. We base our analysis on a simple extension of
the seminal model of Holstron and Tirole (1997), which allows us to formalize the notion
of ’innovation ratios’ and explore the possibility of excess supply of venture capital. The
results we obtain from a panel of European country-level data over 1988-2001 provide new
insights on the eﬀects of alternative policies.
The prevailing policy approach does not receive support from the data. Our results
cast more than a passing doubt on the attempt to increase the share of early stage and
high-tech venture investments by channeling more funds into venture capital markets,
consistent with a ’money chasing deals’ situation (Gompers and Lerner (2000)).
Rather, we ﬁnd that policies aimed at increasing the expected return of projects are
more succeful in altering the composition of venture capital markets towards projects with
less collateral, namely early stage projects and projects in high-tech industries. The avail-
ability of stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies–which provide a lucrative
exit channel–and a decrease in capital gains taxation both raise the share of early stage
and high-tech investments. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that a reduction in some barriers to en-
trepreneurship leads to a large increase in the high-tech ratio. By contrast, the stock of
public R&D holds no eﬀect on the innovation ratios.
These results also suggest a novel interpretation of the ’European Paradox’ (European
Commission (1994))–the fact that Europe suﬀers from an inability to turn scientiﬁcc o m -
petence into successful ventures. In the light of our ﬁndings, the Paradox seems to be due
not to a lack of funding or of attractive technological opportunities, but rather to the
barriers to create new companies and make large proﬁts from them, consistent with recent
models of entrepreneurship (e.g., Gromb and Scharfstein (2002)).
Our ﬁndings also have implications for policy-makers in countries with emerging ven-
ture capital markets, where the impact of policy early in their development might be
particularly important. Even if they reﬂect the European experience, we believe our re-
sults have a clear message: sensible policy should consider a wider set of policies than
simply channeling more funds into venture capital.
W h i l ew ec a n n o to ﬀer a conclusive cost-beneﬁt analysis of alternative policies, we hope
our study of the beneﬁts of a comprehensive set of them may nonetheless oﬀer a valuable
contribution to policy evaluation.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) Holmstron and Tirole (1997) show that A increases when Kvc contracts (and vicev-
ersa). Since γ is exogenous, then A is unaltered and both total venture capital investment,
Dvc, and the innovation ratios unambiguously fall.
(ii) Holmstron and Tirole (1997) show that less capitalized ﬁrms are squeezed out
when R falls. Since Kvc is constant and fully invested in monitoring projects, total venture
investment is unaﬀected; since A∗ − A decreases, the innovation ratios fall.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2:
(i) A decrease in Kvc–such that the excess supply of overall funds persists–causes an
adjustment in S at γ = γ0 so as to counterbalance the fall in private equity funds invested




Thus γ is unchanged, implying that β is unaﬀected, total demand for funds and its
components are unchanged and ∆Kvc is fully invested as uninformed capital.
(ii) A fall in project return R reduces aggregate investment, due to an increase in
A(R,γ) given γ. Its value can be found by substituting the expression for β into equation
(7): A(γ) ≡ A(γ,β)=I − c
pH−pL − (
pH
γ )[R − b+c
pH−pL].M o r e o v e r , A(R,γ) increases by
t h es a m ea m o u n ta sA(R,γ), so that venture capital investment is unaﬀected. Since this
implies that A∗ − A decreases, the innovation ratios unambiguously fall.
Construction of the R&D Capital Stock
The public R&D capital stock (RDit) (measured at the end of period t) in real terms is
computed by a perpetual inventory method with a constant rate of depreciation (δ =0 .15).
The values of R&D public expenditure in local currency at current prices (Rit)a r ea v a i l a b l e
for each country from 1981 onward from OECD Basic Science and Technology Statistics
database. We deﬂate these data by using a country speciﬁcR & Dd e ﬂator (Pit). The
benchmark for the ﬁr s ty e a ru s e di ne s t i m a t i o n(RDi87) is then calculated by summing up







)(1 − δ)1987−t (A1)
For subsequent years, the standard accumulation equation has been used:




Finally, real R&D capital stock data have been made comparable across countries by
applying the 2000 exchange rate with the euro.
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This figure shows the equilibrium in financial markets when the supply of funds to venture capital is fully 
invested in monitored finance.  A represents firm equity capital, γ is the rate of return to uninformed 
financing, β is the rate of return to venture capital, R is the return on investments, Dvc and Kvc are the 
demand and supply of venture capital, S is the supply of uninformed capital. 
 
Panel (a). Firms’ financing  choice as a function of their equity capital, A. 
   
 











Panel (b). Equilibrium in the venture capital market when Kvc is fully invested in monitored finance.  
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Panel (d). A reduction in Kvc is associated with an increase in β and a reduction in aggregate  investment. 
Moreover the innovation  ratios fall because A increases with constant Ā. This brings about a reduction in 
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Panel (e). A reduction in R causes an increase in both A and Ā, a reduction in β1 and an associated 
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  This figure show the equilibrium in financial markets when there is an excess supply of venture capital funds. 
 
 
Panel (a). When Kvc falls and the excess supply persists, the allocation of venture capital funds, and 
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Note: All Ratios are computed for the aggregate of the 14 countries we consider. The ES Ratio is
deﬁn e da st h er a t i oo fESt to VC t. The HT Ratio is deﬁn e da st h er a t i oo fHTt to PEt.T h e
Supply of Funds is the amount of funds raised by the European private equity industry. It is
normalized by the European population.
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Note: For each country, the ES Ratio is deﬁn e da st h er a t i oo fESit to VC it,a n dt h eH TR a t i oi s
deﬁned as the ratio of HTit to PEit.T h eﬁgure shows three-year moving averages for each ratio.
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Mean Std. Dev. Median 5th Perc. 95th Perc. Obs
High-tech ratio 0.294 0.205 0.249 0.049 0.686 187
Early stage ratio 0.218 0.151 0.187 0.036 0.515 187
Capital Gain Tax Rate 0.348 0.060 0.350 0.250 0.450 187
Public R&D stock 17.720 12.131 18.191 2.256 37.210 187
Supply of Funds 0.296 0.638 0.093 0.002 1.162 187
New Market dummy 0.257 — — — — 187
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 6.299 0.976 6.353 4.657 7.940 187
Note: High-tech ratio is the ratio of high-tech to total private equity investments. Early stage ratio
is the ratio of early stage to total venture investments. The Capital Gain Tax Rate is the rate
applied to short term capital gains. Public R&D Stock is the stock of public expenditure in research
and development per inhabitant, as deﬁned in the Appendix. Supply of Funds is the per capita
supply of funds, measured in millions of year 2000 euros. The New Market dummy equals one
for all country-years for which a ’new market’ is open for companies to list; for this variable the
Mean column reports the frequency. The measure of Barriers to entrepreneurship is computed as
an unweighted average of seven competitiveness indicators reported in the 1989-2002 editions of the
World Competitiveness Yearbook (1: Competition law is eﬃcient in preventing unfair competition,
2: Bureaucracy does not hinder business development, 3: Improper practices such as bribing or
corruption do not prevail in the public sphere, 4: Access to foreign capital markets is not restricted
for domestic companies, 5: Hiring and ﬁring practises are ﬂexible enough, 6: Immigration laws do
not prevent companies from employing foreign skills, 7: Foreign investors are free to acquire control
in a domestic company). Each indicator varies from 0 (very high barrier) to 10 (very low barrier).
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Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on time dummies [0.03] [0.09] [0.01]
F-test on individual eﬀects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187 187
Note: CGTit denotes the capital gain tax rate in country i at time t. NM it is a dummy variable
which takes value 1 if a ’New Market’ is available for ﬁrms to list in country i at time t and zero
otherwise. RDit i st h ep e rc a p i t as t o c ko fp u b l i cR & De x p e n d i t u r ei nc o u n t r yia tt i m et ,m e a s u r e d
in millions of 2000 euros. SFit is the per capita supply of funds in country i and time t net
of capital gains, measured in millions of 2000 euros. BARRit is a barrier indicator computed as
an unweighted average of seven indicators, BARR − HFit is the barrier indicator which measures
hiring and ﬁring restrictions, BARR − IMM it is the barrier indicator which measures immigration
law. Time dummies included in all equations. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared)
brackets. *, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 signiﬁcance levels.
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Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on time dummies [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on individual eﬀects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187 187
Note: CGTit denotes the capital gain tax rate in country i at time t. NM it is a dummy variable
which takes value 1 if a ’New Market’ is available for ﬁrms to list in country i at time t and zero
otherwise. RDit i st h ep e rc a p i t as t o c ko fp u b l i cR & De x p e n d i t u r ei nc o u n t r yia tt i m et ,m e a s u r e d
in millions of 2000 euros. SFit is the per capita supply of funds in country i and time t net
of capital gains, measured in millions of 2000 euros. BARRit is a barrier indicator computed as
an unweighted average of seven indicators, BARR − HFit is the barrier indicator which measures
hiring and ﬁring restrictions, BARR − IMM it is the barrier indicator which measures immigration
law. Time dummies included in all equations. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared)
brackets. *, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 signiﬁcance levels.
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